In this paper a multi-valued propositional logic | logic of agreement | in terms of its model theory and inference system is presented. This formal system is the natural consequence of a new way to approach concepts as commonsense knowledge, uncertainty and approximate reasoning | the point of view of agreement. Particularly, it is discussed a possible extension of the Classical Theory of Sets based on the idea that, instead of trying to conceptualize sets as \fuzzy" or \vague" entities, it is more adequate to de ne membership as the result of a partial agreement among a group of individual agents. Furthermore, it is shown that the concept of agreement provides a framework for the development of a formal and sound explanation for concepts (e.g. fuzzy sets) which lack formal semantics. According to the de nition of agreement, an individual agent agrees or not with the fact that an object possesses a certain property. A clear distinction is then established, between an individual agent | to whom deciding whether an element belongs to a set is just a yes or no matter | and a commonsensical agent | the one who interprets the knowledge shared by a certain group of people. Finally, the logic of agreement is presented and discussed. As it is assumed the existence of several individual agents, the semantic system is based on the perspective that each individual agent de nes her/his own conceptualization of reality. So the semantics of the logic of agreement can be seen as being similar to a semantics of possible worlds, one for each individual agent. The proof theory is an extension of a natural deduction system, using supported formulas and incorporating only inference rules. Moreover, the soundness and completeness of the logic of agreement are also presented.
Introduction
Commonsense reasoning and representation are particularly relevant topics in Arti cial Intelligence 23]. The present approach to these issues is based upon the idea that commonsense derives from the knowledge that is held, used, and shared by a group of individuals. Recall that the etymology of the word \common-sense" is the \sharing of feelings" (among people about themselves and the world). In fact, it can be hypothesized that what people call reality derives from the agreement among a set of individuals. As a consequence, a commonsensical concept like \tall," when characterizing a certain person, for instance, should be framed with respect to a certain group of individuals. Of course, being considered as tall di ers strongly if commonsense emerges from a group of bushmen or swedish individuals. The fact that agreement among individuals is not always perfect suggests a kind of uncertainty exhibiting some similarities with the concept of fuzziness introduced by Lofti Zadeh 27] . However, the fuzzy approach has been criticized due to its subjectivity: this is the reason logicists argue against \fuzzy logics" (see a reply from Sheridan to Dubois and Prade 8] ). The controversy that has emerged since the introduction of Fuzzy Set Theory by Zadeh 27] involving their supporters and detractors is not surprising. On the one hand, the former assert that it captures the intuition regarding a special kind of uncertainty | fuzziness | and, on the other hand, the later claim against the lack of a precise characterization of the theory and, particularly, the arbitrariness of the choice of operators and membership functions 4] 16] 20]. In fact, the lack of a strict semantic characterization of fuzzy sets makes impossible the task of establishing a well-founded Fuzzy Logic | a formal system which allows inference regarding some conceptualization of reality. For those who favour rigorous and precise foundations, it is clear that Fuzzy Logic should be improved. Although there are (several) di erent interpretations of the partial membership concept, most of them are based on intuitive grounds, being presented a posteriori in order to justify the utilization of fuzzy sets. Moreover, the fuzzy operators commonly used are not semantically supported. As a consequence they could provide unacceptable results. In this paper a research exploring the idea of agreement and its use to model human knowledge and reasoning in what concerns commonsense is presented. Therefore, the concept of agreement is used for establishing a strict semantic characterization of fuzzy sets and operators, revisiting its foundations, rede ning the basic operators, providing a rigorous meaning to them and shedding light on certain di culties which were already pointed out by others 3] 5] 10] 16] 20]. Also, the new de nition of partial membership provides a framework for the development of a formal system to approximate reasoning | the logic of agreement, a multi-valued extension of the classical logic 2]. In Section 2 the concept of agreement is discussed in terms of commonsense knowledge, as a measure of a certain kind of uncertainty. It is also compared with other concepts that were presented to explain di erent types of uncertainty, namely fuzziness. In Section 3 the main de nitions and results of the agreement notion | in terms of a set theory | are introduced. In Section 4, an example exploring the di erences between agreement and classic fuzzy based operators is presented. In Section 5 some consequences of the agreement idea are presented. In Section 6 the semantic system of the logic of agreement is introduced and presented. Section 7 describes the corresponding proof theory. Section 8 discusses the operationalization issues of the logic of agreement, and nally in Section 9 conclusions and some considerations about current and future work are presented.
Motivation and Philosophical Issues
The point of view of the present work is that fuzziness results from an incomplete agreement among agents when faced with the characterization of a certain object. Moreover, it is hypothesized that each agent when considered separately is able of deciding on a yes or no basis, whether a certain object belongs or not to a given set. That \Paul is tall," \Mary is middle-aged" and, \seven is much greater than two," and so on, raises no di culties of membership characterization to a single agent 1 . This fact has already been stressed by Hayes 14] . A membership grade di erent from zero or one only comes up when someone tries to represent not a personal but a commonsensical interpretation of the reality. Reality | in fact, a certain conceptualization of it | derives from agreement among agents and, if no agreement at all is reached about an object, a fact, or an event, it is not possible to decide them as being \real." In classical terms, for instance, when de ning the semantics of First Order Logic it is usual considering not the \reality" (something that exists outside the agent) but a conceptualization of it, accepted by the agent 13]. This is a way to circumvent the philosophical problems which derive from discussing the existence of reality. In fact, the philosophical foundations of the present approach are based on constructing the reality through agreement. This perspective is similar to the one suggested by Edgar Morin when discussing objectivity in science: objectivity is nothing but accepted inter-subjectivity. Therefore, if someone intends to characterize fuzziness, a clear distinction should be made: when an agent expresses a personal point of view (\an individual agent") and when an agent interprets the points of view of a group (\a commonsensical agent"). Frequently, when confronting points of view with others individuals discover that some of their beliefs have less epistemic entrenchment than others. The proposed semantic characterization of fuzzy sets is based on the concept of agreement: the ratio of agents agreeing with the membership of an object to a set w.r.t. the total number of questioned agents. This seems to be a neat and simple frequencist approach which has been around for centuries, successfully applied to other areas of research. Consider, for instance, the task of evaluating a paper submitted to a conference. Assume that each reviewer is only asked whether the paper should be accepted or not. The easiest way to sort the papers is to grade each paper in terms of the number of acceptances w.r.t. the total number of reviewers. The program chair of the conference can establish a semantics in terms of grades and labels: grade 0.0, de nitely not accepted, grade 1.0, de nitely accepted, grade 0.5 corresponding to maximum ignorance (or minimal discrimination between the two possible choices). Now imagine that the program chair asks reviewers to evaluate soundness and originality of papers in digital terms (accepted as sound, rejected as original, and son on). After processing the data, that is to say after calculating the agreement, the program chair has two grades (between zero and one) assigned to each paper | one for soundness and one for originality. How should the program chair sort the papers? Probably, she/he will be tempted to sort the papers on the basis of the conjunction (sort the papers on the basis of being sound and original). For instance, if the program chair is an expert in Fuzzy Logic it is likely that she/he will use the min operator. Another approach is to nd the ratio between the number of reviewers who gave positive answers to both aspects (the individual conjunctions) w.r.t. the total number of reviewers. The former procedure should not be used because it is generally unsound | usually it provides di erent results when compared with the later. Another possibility could be the utilization of the product (instead of min); however, this procedure is only sound when the two aspects of the problem are independent (in fact, soundness and originality are not independent 2 ). Therefore, an essential result to achieve (with a semantic characterization) is demonstrating that if from a set of N agents result two membership grades for objects A and B in a set S, and if, from the very same agents result a membership grade for A B (or A \ B) in the same set S, the chosen operators for union (and for intersection, respectively) should respect the results previously determined. In a nut shell, the algebraic manipulation (syntax) should be consistent with the meaning (semantics) assigned to fuzzy sets and operators. It should be pointed out that the known operators (min, max, product, drastic sum, etc.) do not exhibit the intended characteristic of soundness. On the other hand, human beings usually prefer to produce simple evaluations and fast decisions instead of complex and time-consuming analyses. As a consequence of this quest for fast judgements, human reasoning loses frequently in terms of precision, raising therefore the issue of uncertainty. Moreover, the complexity of real situations is often too high to allow a complete and detailed description 28]. Also, since commonsense knowledge could usually be linked to symbols in some language, it raises the problem of symbol ambiguity, as it has been recognized by several authors 17] 29]. These two aspects | lack of precision and symbol ambiguity | lead frequently to human reasoning and communication involving di erent types of uncertainty. For instance, fuzzy theory researchers consider a kind of uncertainty called fuzziness, which is usually associated with vagueness concerning the description of the semantic meaning of events or concepts 29]. On the other hand, Dubois and Prade consider that \modelling vagueness is a problem of representing what is sometimes called lexical imprecision of linguistic terms " 9] . In order to understand concepts as grade of membership it is important to study the way human beings de ne and establish categories or classes. The de nition of a prototype constitutes one possibility to characterize the class and to determine the grade of membership for each element, being de ned by the grade of similarity between the element and the prototype. However, this method is not applicable to problems where there are no way to nd a prototype (e.g. the class of the numbers much greater than 2) or when it is possible to choose several prototypes (e.g. the class of good tennis players). Nevertheless, studies carried out on the area of psychology suggest that membership is not a \prim-itive" concept, meaning that a grade of membership is not generally de ned absolutely by an individual 7]. Indeed, it varies from individual to individual according to certain internal and external factors, which in fact in uence and characterize each individual. Albeit the initial idea of phenomena being inherently vague, it is now widely accepted that vagueness emerges from the observation and description of the world, i.e., it depends on the human observer. So, di erent observers could have di erent interpretations of the phenomena under consideration 9] 19]. At rst sight, a good candidate for representing and reasoning about vagueness is the fuzzy logic approach. However, \fuzzy logic" cannot be yet considered as a logic in the sense that, (i) it does not have a formal model theory | a semantic system, (ii) it does not rely on a unique inference system | there are several inference mechanisms to be applied according to the situation, and (iii) fundamental concepts, as the membership function, for instance, are ill-de ned. As recognized by Zimmermann 29] : \Fuzziness has so far not been de ned uniquely semantically ...]". So, in order to handle these problems, the following aspects of FST should be taken into account:
(i) the choice of the rules of inference is usually arbitrary or at most based on algebraic arguments, (ii) whenever such a choice is not supported by a formal semantic justi cation, soundness cannot be ensured, (iii) in order to develop a formal model theory it is necessary to give a (formal and informal) semantic de nition of basic concepts and operators (e.g., fuzzy connectives). Otherwise, when FST is applied to certain problems (see the pencil of Sheridan-Fine example in Sect. 4) it delivers puzzling answers and weird results. Nevertheless, the main problems are not in the \logic" itself but in its very foundations: the Fuzzy Set Theory. The basic element of FST is the notion of fuzzy set presented by Zadeh as a generalization of the classical set. Although there is some consensus about the intuitive meaning of a fuzzy set, the lack of a uni ed formal semantic characterization of this concept is a drawback of FST. Furthermore, basic operations such as union and intersection of fuzzy sets can be performed using di erent mechanisms as the min, max, drastic product and sum, to name but a few. As it was mentioned before, the representation of vague concepts depends on the observer (or agent). Considering this idea, fuzzy approaches usually assume that each agent is individually capable of de ning the most adequate fuzzy set to represent a vague concept. So, the majority of fuzzy applications (including fuzzy expert systems) starts from this point, by de ning fuzzy sets for the problem in hand, choosing the fuzzy operators and establishing inference rules, only based on a problem-dependent basis. This methodology can be understood because of pragmatic reasons, as e ciency, computation time, and development e ort. However, when one wants to justify the options made, the question \how the fuzzy sets were chosen," i.e., \where did they come from," should be considered seriously. A work that tries to answer these questions is the TEE model presented by E. Hisdal. This model is based on an assumption that the subjective meaning which an individual assigns to a fuzzy concept can be measured by performing three experiments: i) a labelling experiment, in which an individual assigns a particular label (e.g. tall), from a set of labels (e.g. small, medium, tall), to every object at a given time, ii) a yes-no experiment, in which the individual is required to answer with yes or no concerning the adequacy of a label to every object, and iii) a membership experiment, in which the individual is asked to give a degree, between zero and one, concerning the tness of a label to every object 16]. Using these experiments together with the probabilistic theory, Hisdal introduces a model for interpreting and explaining how an individual de nes her/his membership function for a particular fuzzy concept. Based on the assumptions considered in the TEE model, the de nitions of the fuzzy set operators are reformulated and justi ed, and some di culties of the fuzzy set theory are circumvented. The main di erences between the TEE model and the agreement framework lie not only on their foundations but also on their objectives: i) the TEE model considers only an individual whereas the agreement concept considers a set of individuals, ii) the degree of membership obtained by the TEE model is based on a probabilistic analysis of the experiments performed whereas the degree of agreement establishes a measure of consensus among a group of individuals, iii) the TEE model provides a numeric formalism based on probability for handling fuzzy concepts, whereas the agreement framework underlies a rigorous semantic system and a proof theory for a symbolic multi-valued logic that is capable to cope with partial agreement, and iv) the TEE model assumes that the individual is capable of choosing membership degrees whereas the agreement framework is based on two kinds of agents: the individual agent, which can only give yes or no answers and the commonsensical agent, which interprets the points of view of a group of individual agents. So, the individual considered in the TEE model can be seen as a commonsensical agent. In fact, when Hisdal discusses the third experiment | the membership degree assignment | she questions where does a particular degree, between zero and one, which an individual assigns to an object, come from. Hisdal assumes that an individual must have some internally stored procedure for choosing this degree. The agreement framework is a possible way to explain how such procedure can be establish. For instance, Dubois and Prade say that \Classi cation itself is not objective. Our way of classifying objects may di er from our neighbors'. At best, it may be a matter of consensus. " 9] As mentioned before, agents can have two di ering roles: as individual agents and as commonsensical agents. An individual agent is an abstract entity which uses the classical set theory (and classical logic) to make decisions. So, when asked if a women with, say, 1.70 height is tall, a particular individual agent answers on a yes or no basis. In this case, it is clearly a matter of true/false decision on the logic value of a proposition 12] 14]. However, when raising the same question to a group of individuals it is conceivable to nding a degree of acceptance of that particular proposition ranging from zero (complete rejection) to one (complete acceptance). When an agent associates non zero/one degrees of acceptance to propositions she/he is behaving as a commonsensical agent, who interprets the feelings of a group with a su cient number of individuals. Therefore, to characterize a fuzzy set, several individual agents are questioned concerning the membership of an element on a particular class or category. The proportion of the number of positive answers w.r.t. the total number of answers is called degree of agreement. If this degree is interpreted as the membership grade of the element in the class, it is possible to de ne a membership function representing the sethood of the class. For instance, if the number of individual agents that agree with the fact that a 1.7m height individual is tall, is 80 out of 100, then the degree of agreement within the group is 0.8. So the membership grade of a 1.7m height element in the set of tall individuals is 0.8. A commonsensical agent would assign the logical value 0.8 to the proposition \An individual 1.7m height is tall". The idea of de ning (or interpreting) the membership degree as the proportion of positive answers among a population was already suggested by others. For instance, J. F. Baldwin introduced an interpretation of fuzzy set based on a voting model with constant thresholds 1]. Each voter (person) accepts or rejects that a speci c object satis es a particular fuzzy concept. The proportion of voters who accept is associated with the membership degree. The constant threshold assumption means that anyone who accepts an object with a certain membership level will accept all objects with a higher membership level. That is to say, a voter should either know a priori the membership level for a particular object or de ne a metric suitable for classifying the object, in order to be consistent with the constant threshold assumption. However, both hypothesis can be questioned. In the former case, if a voter knows the membership level, how does it come from and what is the purpose of the voting process? In the later case, the problem lies on the fact that most of the fuzzy concepts do not have an unique and objective metric. On the contrary, within the agreement framework, an individual agent needs not neither an a priori membership level nor a speci c metric. Also, instead of considering the results of the voting process as a way to establish the probability that a member of population, drawn at random, answers in a particular manner, these results can be seen as a measure of the degree of agreement among the voters.
Foundations of the Agreement Logic
As it is assumed that individual agents use the classic set theory in order to answer questions relatively to the membership of an element in a set, the following axioms express the traditional de nitions of set complement, union and intersection. Let A be a subset of X and x an element of X, the universe of discourse.
Axiom 1 Omniscience
When an individual agent is questioned about the belongingness of an element x in a set A, she/he is always capable of deciding in an yes/no basis.
This axiom excludes the possibility of getting answers like \I do not know", \maybe", among others. There are two kinds of situations which can be found: one that presupposes a set with clear cut boundaries, and another where sets have blurred frontiers. As examples, consider respectively the questions \Is ten greater than one?", and \Is ten much greater than one?". The Classical Set Theory (CST) was de ned mainly to handle the former. Some authors consider that the later should also be handled by CST as agents are always capable of establishing a clear cut frontier and act accordingly. In what concerns a single agent, this hypothesis can be accepted provided that this agent performs as an abstract entity. However, it is interesting to notice that children tend to use a kind of digital process for categorizing objects and, therefore, they show some di culties to understand that usually things are not only \black and white". In fact, when asking children about the belongingness of elements to sets answers are quick and direct. On the contrary, adults tend to feel uncomfortable when asked by children to answer in an yes/no basis, trying in certain cases to pathetically answer in a fuzzy fashion. That is to say, adults act normally as commonsensical agents (possibly because they were exposed to the opinions of others during their long life time). Therefore, it can be hypothesized that when a real agent (an adult human being) expresses doubts about the belongingness of an element in a set she/he is acting as a \commonsensical agent" who takes into consideration a lack of agreement about a particular concept within a group of individuals. A di cult issue deserving discussion is the consistency of answers along time and in di erent situations. An agent could consider Mary as a tall person and Bea as a very tall, although they have the same height, just because Mary is fat and Bea is not. Or considering Mary as tall now and very tall when wearing a vertical stripped dress. In order to avoid this kind of di culty, the proposed approach does not impose constraints or assumptions on how an individual agent should perform, beyond the acceptance of the present axioms. 
Axiom 2 Negation
When an individual agent believes that an element x belongs to a set A then she/he also accepts that x does not belong to the complement of A, A, and vice-versa.
Certain human beings, in particular examples, do not respect this axiom. However, these cases correspond to elements presumably located near an imaginary borderline establishing the boundary between the set A and its complement. As real agents should perform like ideal (rational) individual agents, it is always possible to clear things up and restore consistency. In fact, the experiments of Hersh and Caramazza 15] also con rm the hypothesis stated in the Axiom 2. Based on Axiom 2 the concordance of an agent relatively to the membership in a complement set is given through the function cc. When an individual agent believes that x belongs to a set A and also believes that x belongs to a set B, then she/he believes that x belongs to the intersection of sets A and B, and vice-versa.
Human agents exhibit two kinds of behaviour when categorizing objects: a best-t approach (when the agent assigns one and only one label to the object, corresponding to the best describing characteristic), and a subsumption perspective (when the agent assigns several labels which are \acceptable" to describe the object). For instance, consider an individual who is asked whether John Smith (2.35m) is tall, and whether he is very tall. In the former case (best t), the agent will only assign the label very tall, and in the later the agent will assign both labels, as all very tall persons are also tall.
Notice that this di culty only arises when the labels are associated with the same characteristic (attribute) under evaluation (in this case, height). A more subtle example is the assignment of colors to objects. Suppose, say, a reddish orange pencil. Some individuals will consider its color as red and some as orange. On the one hand, the very same individual seldom considers the pencil as red and orange. However, on the other hand, almost all individuals accept the fact that deep orange is a kind of light red. So there is an overlapping between these two sets (red and orange). Of course, when applying the best t approach, individuals are considering sets as disjoint (e.g., tall/very tall, red/orange, and so on). Also, the order by which the questions are raised is relevant to the answers got (if the question \Is John Smith tall?" is asked before the question \Is John Smith very tall?," it is likely to get two positive answers even when a best t approach is considered). As the present axiom does not consider the order of conjuncts as a relevant aspect, a special care must be taken to avoid erroneous results. Another interesting case involving colors in a conjunction is the Portuguese ag example: the ag is divided vertically with colors green and red (the area of red being slightly bigger than the area of green). In the vertical line there is an heraldic sphere (yellow) with a complex drawing including small castles, shields in blue and white. When asked about the color of the ag, very few people accept green as the color of the ag. On the other hand, few people accept red as the color of the ag. However, almost all consider the Portuguese ag as being green and red. Notice that there is nothing fuzzy in the ag (colors are primitive, by de nition). This is a case where people, although accepting the conjunction, do not accept each one of the conjuncts. (Can this be explained because the green and red is now a single predicate?). This example illustrates the di culties of formalizing natural language concepts. It is important to notice that in any case (best t or subsumption approaches) the Logic of Agreement | which is based upon the present axioms | performs correctly although providing di erent results. It is however crucial that all agents (performing as individual agents) should adopt the very same methodology when categorizing objects, in order to maintain consistency. In fact, some interesting di erences will arise depending on the approach taken: for instance, and not surprisingly, when the best t approach is chosen, it is not possible to nding a \strong" implication between, say, being very tall and being tall as it happens if the other approach is considered. Again the function cc is used to represent the assumption introduced by Axiom 3. If A and B are two sets then cc(i; x; A \ B) = cc(i; x; A)cc(i; x; B) Axiom 4 Disjunction When an individual agent believes that x belongs to a set A or that x belongs to a set B (or both) then she/he should also accept that x belongs to the union of sets A and B, and vice-versa. This axiom establishes the semantics of the connective \or". In natural language, the \or" is, in most cases, utilized in the exclusive sense, presumably because it allows direct inferences. For instance, knowing that \Mary is either tall or very tall," as soon as it is found out that \Mary is tall" it can be inferred that \Mary is not very tall" (best t approach). However, this axiom is based on an inclusive sense for the connective \or" because it is more general than the previous one. (Notice that it is always possible to associate conjunctions and disjunctions for expressing propositions involving exclusive \or"). Therefore, agents performing as individual agents should understand the \or" in the inclusive sense. Once again the function cc is utilized to represent the assumption introduced by Axiom 4. The example is particularly interesting because it raises some of the di culties found when Fuzzy Set Theory is used. Sheridan writes: \Say we have a pencil that is fairly red, and fairly orange. I claim that it is at least conceivable that it is very red or orange. (In fact there is such a pencil, but that doesn't matter.) With the \most popular" choice of operators (Dubois and Prade's equations (14) and (15)) this is impossible:
the pencil is fairly red or orange (t(P _ Q) = max(t(P); t(Q)). t(P) is the degree of truth of the proposition P.)" (Sheridan's emphasis; equations (14) and (15) correspond to max and min operators, respectively). The purpose of presenting this example is twofold: on the one hand, it will be used to demonstrate that the agreement-based operators do not exhibit the type of problems pointed out by Sheridan and, on the other hand, to illustrate the two possible ways individuals use for categorizing objects | best t or subsumption (see section 3). Suppose that N agents were questioned concerning the acceptance of the membership of p in the set of orange pencils O and in the set of red pencils R. To ease the understanding of this example, assume that the following labels are associated with degrees of agreement: 0:6 \slightly", 0:7 \fairly", 0:8 \strongly", 0:9 \very", and 1:0 \completely". Consider rst the subsumption approach. In this case, ac(p 2 O) = 0:7 ac(p 2 R) = 0:7
That is to say, 70% of the individual agents consider that the pencil belongs to the set of orange pencils (the commonsensical agent considers it fairly orange), and the same proportion of the individuals agents consider that the pencil belongs to the set of red pencils (the commonsensical agent considers it fairly red). This means that there are individual agents considering that the pencil belongs to both sets | red and orange. In fact, at least 40% of them, or at most 70% of them 4 . This is not surprising as the pencil is reddish orange (the only explanation for the answers got) and because of the approach taken | subsumption. On the other hand, as a direct consequence of proposition 2, it is not possible to nd the degree of agreement for a disjunction only on the basis of the degrees of agreement of each one of the disjuncts: it is also necessary to know the degree of agreement for the conjunction. (Union and intersection are the two side of the very same coin). For those who are used to evaluate membership degrees utilizing the max and min operators this conclusion could seem a bit complex; however, this is the price to pay on being precise. Particularly, in this example, the utilization of max leads to the (strange) conclusion that the pencil is also fairly red or orange. Then it can be concluded that the pencil is very red or orange (the conclusion suggested by Sheridan).
As the union (disjunction) operation depends on the intersection (conjunction) one, it is possible to obtain di erent grades of agreement for p 2 O R. For instance, if the conjunction degree of agreement is 0.4, the disjunction degree is 1.0, meaning that the pencil is completely red or orange. On the other hand, if the conjunction degree of agreement is 0.7, the disjunction degree of agreement is 0.7. Only in this case the result given by the fuzzy operator max equals the one obtained by agreement-based operators. The mentioned conclusions deserve some comments. First of all, how can be explained that the degree of agreement of the disjunction is less than 1.0? The only explanation is that there are individual agents considering simultaneously that the pencil does not belong to the set O and does not belong to the set R. Perhaps they consider the pencil as yellow. Possibly there are individual agents considering that the color of the pencil is reddish-orange and decided not to accept the only two labels provided: red, orange. This situation is strange as agents were advised to use the subsumption approach. Recall that in this approach, individual agents assume that there could be an overlapping between sets and they should answer yes to both membership questions when the element belongs to the intersection. Notice that, due to the fact that the perception mechanisms of individuals are di erent, allows to getting, for the very same pencil, the answers \red", \orange", and \red and orange". Consider now the best t approach. In this case individual agents will assign one and only one color label to the pencil. So, the sum of the degrees of agreement for both colors cannot be higher than 1:0.
Suppose that the degrees of agreement for both membership relations, p 2 O and p 2 R, is 0:5. This means that there is a maximum disagreement among individual agents and, therefore, they do not provide any useful information for discriminating between red and orange as the color of the pencil. As the degree of agreement for the conjunction is zero (best t approach), using proposition 2 it is obtained, That is to say, the pencil is de nitely red or orange. This is an interesting case of maximumignorance on the disjuncts (impossibility of discriminating between red and orange) and minimum ignorance on the disjunction (it is certain that the pencil is either red or orange).
Of course, depending on the color of the pencil, it is possible to obtain, say, ac(p 2 O) = 0:3 and ac(p 2 R) = 0:7. In this case, the commonsensical agent considers the pencil as fairly red, and fairly not orange. But, it is also possible that ac(p 2 O) = 0:4 and ac(p 2 R) = 0:4. In this case there are, possibly, agents who think that the label reddish-orange is a better classi cation for p. As individual agents are answering under a best t approach, the commonsensical agent is not completely sure that the pencil is either orange or red (ac(p 2 O R) = 0:8).
It should be stressed that the agreement-based operators perform correctly in both cases | best t and subsumption | provided that the individual agents be advised to maintain consistency in their judgements. It is claimed that the formal semantics which results from the agreement approach delivers conclusions that are acceptable in a commonsense framework. In other words, the formal semantics ts the informal one | in a nut shell, it makes sense.
Consequences of the agreement-based semantics
Interpreting the grade of membership A (x) of an element x in a fuzzy set A as the degree of agreement among N individual agents w.r.t. the membership of x in A, demonstrates that the operators usually used in fuzzy set theory should be re-evaluated.
The most popular choice of operators for intersection and union is min and max, respectively 7] 29] 26]. Based on the new interpretation of grade of membership it is clear that both operators are not adequate considering propositions 1 and 2. Also the pair product/probabilistic sum has been frequently used as operators for those operations. However, based on the agreement de nitions, this pair is also inadequate to represent the intersection and union of fuzzy sets. Notice that only when the covariance is zero, the intersection is given by the product.
With the agreement interpretation of the meaning of vague concepts, it is possible to de ne a rigorous but clear semantics of a logic involving classic and non-classic propositions. A classic one is represented by a degree of agreement that it is one (or zero), i.e., all the agents agree (or disagree) on the membership of an element in a class.
Since it is supposed that each agent is a rational individual using rst order logic to reason about the would not exist, then it would be impossible to reason under agreement (at least with some degree of accuracy). This should be a very puzzling conclusion as people usually derive conclusions from premises stated under agreement. For instance, most of the people agrees that Spielberg movies are good. When a new Spielberg movie comes up, people should agree, at least a priori, that it should be good. Of course, the degree of agreement of the former proposition should positively in uence the degree of the latter. In terms of inference, the logic of agreement is based on a natural deduction system using therefore only rules of inference. It takes propositions and their respective degrees of agreement and it generates other propositions and the corresponding degrees of agreement. It works as multi-valued logic through the manipulation of degrees of agreement. By comparison with fuzzy logic, the logic of agreement is less expressive, since the former uses membership functions in its inference process and it allows the inference of new membership functions. However, this process is justi ed only in mathematical terms using the idea of fuzzy relation as an extension of classic (crisp) relation 7]. As there is no semantic system, there are no semantic justi cations for this kind of inference methodology. Besides that there are several multi-valued logics 7] each one based on its own set theory, i.e., each one satisfying a particular set of axioms, but none having a semantic framework to justify its utilization.
Semantic system
In order to create the semantics of a logic, it is necessary to establish a conceptualization of reality, to de ne the relevant objects of the world for a speci c problem, as well as to establish the relations among the objects. The set of objects of the conceptualization is called universe of discourse.
Since the existence of several individual agents is assumed, the semantic system incorporates the perspective that each agent de nes her/his own conceptualization of reality. However, when agents are asked about a property of an object, each one conceptualizes the property di erently, but the object involved should be the same so the aggregation of answers would make sense. For instance, if agents are asked whether John is tall, all the agents must be considering the same John. The same hypothesis is assumed for functions. For instance, when the question involves the son of Peter (for example, John), all agents should consider the same John. Finally for the relations of the conceptualizations of reality, it is assumed that the agents have total freedom of conceptualizing each relevant property. Therefore, supposing that there are N agents, the semantic system considers N conceptualizations of reality, with the same objects and functions, but (possibly) di erent relations. Prior to the full de nition of the semantic system, it is essential to have a formal language allowing the representation of propositions about the conceptualized world. These propositions are represented by formulas of the language, according to a speci c alphabet and certain rules of formation. The evaluation of a formula depends on the interpretation given to each element in the formula, i.e., it depends on the relation between the elements of the language and the elements of the conceptualization | objects, functions and relations. As usual, the concept of interpretation I is de ned as the mapping from the elements of the language to the elements of the conceptualization.
Since there are di erent conceptualizations, it is also assumed that there are di erent interpretations I i , one for each agent. As the objects and functions are the same in all conceptualizations, all the interpretations map an object or function constant of the language into the same objects or functions of the conceptualization. Each agent should conceptualize a property by a classical relation through the de nition of a classical set of objects that satisfy the property. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the connection among conceptualizations, interpretations and language. In order to aggregate the information provided by N agents, the concept of (agreed) satisfaction, in the logic of agreement (LA), is de ned. If a formula A is satis ed in a value , by the set of possible worlds W, then it is said that is the logical value of the formula A. Next it will be de ned the concept of collective or simultaneous satisfaction, that is to say the satisfaction of a set of formulas. 
Proof theory
The syntactic system of the logic of agreement is a natural deduction system: Natural deduction systems include, instead of logical axioms, as usual, a set of inference rules, normally two per connective (one for introduction and another for elimination). To start a proof, it is usually provided a \rule of hypothesis" which allows the introduction of assumptions that will be the premises of the derived conclusions. The present natural deduction system has several predecessors, namely the systems of Lemmon 21] , Fitch 11 ], Martins and Shapiro 22] , and Pinto-Ferreira and Martins 25] , among others. One of the major di erences between the present proof theory and others is that some rules of inference need three (instead of two) formulas (premises) to infer a consequence. For instance, consider the Modus Ponens rule. In the logic of agreement, it is not enough A and A ! B to infer B. In fact, it is also needed A $ B, a \measure" of the proportion of agents having the same opinion (concordance or not) about A and B. This could seem strange at rst sight; however, to infer under agreement more information is needed. The proof theory of the logic of agreement will be de ned in terms of three aspects: alphabet, rules of formation and rules of inference.
Alphabet
The alphabet de nes all symbols that could and will be used to establish the proof theory.
De nition 12 Alphabet
The alphabet of the syntactic system of the logic of agreement is the union of the following disjoint sets:
i) P: non-empty set of predicate symbols. Each element of P has associated a non-negative number called rank. P 0 is the set of proposition symbols. ii) F: set of function symbols. Each element of F has associated a non-negative number called rank. F 0 is the set of constant symbols. This set includes all the symbols representing objects of the universe of discourse.
iii) Set of connectives: f:; !;^; _;$g. iv) Set of punctuation symbols: f(; ); ; g.
Rules of formation
This section presents rules that must be followed in order to de ne formulas accepted in the language of the logic of agreement. Since this logic is for now a zero-order logic, the rules of formation allow only the de nition of zero-order formulas.
De nition 13 Term A term is an element of the set F 0 or = (x 1 ; : : :; x n ), where 2 F n and x i is a term, i = 1; : : :; n.
De nition 14 Rules of formation
The rules of formation of formulas of the logic of agreement are the following ones:
i) if 2 P n and x i is a term, i = 1; : : :; n, then (x 1 ; : : :; x n ) is a well-formed formula (w ) called atomic formula.
ii) is A and B are well-formed formulas, then :A, A _ B, A^B, A ! B and A $ B are also well-formed formulas.
iii) Nothing else is a well-formed formula.
Natural deduction systems allow the establishment of a distinction between hypothesis (assumptions) and derived formulas. As mentioned, assumptions are introduced by a rule of hypothesis and derived formulas are the ones inferred through the application of inference rules. Certain rules of inference demand the knowledge about which hypothesis underlie a given conclusion. This implies that the computational system which implements the proof theory ought to have a dependency recording mechanism, that is to say, to each derived formula is associated the set (or sets) of premises which were utilized to reach the conclusion. On the other hand, as inference in the present proof theory should provide not only a derived formula but also its degree of credibility (a value in the interval 0; 1] which is the counterpart of the degree of agreement in the proof theory), the inference system should process not only formulas but also supported formulas. Supported formulas are aggregated objects including a formula and the degree of credibility.
De nition 15 Supported formula
A supported formula is a pair < A; cr >, where A is a well-formed formula and cr is the corresponding degree of credibility.
Rules of inference
This section introduces rules of inference allowing the derivation of a formula from a set of others.
As any traditional natural deduction system, the logic of agreement includes typically two rules for each logical connective plus two rules for introducing and eliminating hypothesis and a Reductio ad Absurdum rule. Therefore, its rules of inference are as following (as usual, the symbol`means \infer"):
Rule of Hypothesis Introduction (HIP-I)
At any point of a proof it is possible to introduce an hypothesis < A; cr >.
Rule of Hypothesis Elimination (HIP-E)
This rule allows the elimination of hypothesis, i.e., If f< A 1 ; cr 1 >; : : :; < A n ; cr n >; < A; x >g`< B; cr > and cr does not depend on x then f< A 1 ; cr 1 >; : : :; < A n ; cr n >g`< B; cr > Rule of Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA)
Given a proof of < B; y 1 > derived from a set of supported formulas = f< A 1 ; cr 1 >; : : :; < A n ; cr n >g and a proof of < B; y 2 >, where y 2 6 = y 1 (a contradiction), derived from a set of formulas f< A; x >g, where x 6 = cr. Then it is possible to infer < A; cr > only from the set .
Rule of Classical Logic (LC) Let ? = fa 1 ; : : :; A n g a set of formulas. From = f< A 1 ; 1 >; : : :; < A n ; 1 >g, if A is derivable from ? using classical logic, then it can be derived < A; 1 >.
Derivability, Soundness and Completeness
In this section, the concepts related to derivability in the logic of agreement are introduced. It is also shown that the logic is sound and complete, which means that a formula that was derived from a set of premises, by the application of inference rules, is a logical consequence of that set, and vice versa, respectively.
De nition 16 Deductive sequence
A deductive sequence is a nite sequence of supported formulas P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :; P n , where for all i, 1 i n, P i is obtained through the application of an inference rule with the premises included in the set fP 1 ; : : :; P i?1 g.
De nition 17 Proof
A proof of a supported formula P from a set of supported formulas is a deductive sequence P 1 ; P 2 ; : : :; P n , where P n = P and fP 1 ; : : :; P n g. De nition 18 Derivability in the logic of agreement If there is a proof of a supported formula P from a set of supported formulas , then it is said that P is derived from , denoted by `P.
The following two theorems show that the logic of agreement is both sound and complete.
Theorem 1 Soundness of the logic of agreement Let = f< A 1 ; cr 1 >; : : :; < A n ; cr n >g be a set of supported formulas and < A; cr > a supported formula. If `< A; cr > then ? j = LA ; A, where ? = fA 1 ; : : :; A n g, = fcr 1 ; : : :; cr n g and = cr. 
Operationalization issues
A relevant aspect concerning a new theory is its operationalization. Does the agreement approach demand the elaboration of questionnaires to be distributed to a (high) number of individuals in order to get degrees of agreement? Isn't it too heavy to have practical applicability? In fact, there are two perspectives. One concerns the eld experiments to establish whether the system performs according to the human agreement approach. This phase demands experimentation with a high number of agents and is advisable to be performed (some work has already been done in this direction).
On the other hand, the utilization of the agreement-based approach can be done using a commonsensical agent who provides values for the degrees of agreement. However, she/he should be supported by an expert who should ensure the consistency of her/his assessments. (The commonsensical agent should understand, for instance, that a value near 0:5 means inability of discriminating (ignorance), a value near zero means not belongingness (negation), and so on).
Of course, this is much more complicate than just using classical theory of sets. However, the semantics of the classical theory of sets is (at least at rst sight) very simple and obvious, so it is possible to base inference only on algebraic arguments. In order to illustrate how the logic of agreement can be utilized to perform inference consider the Sheridan-Fine pencil example discussed previously. Suppose that the knowledge base is composed by the following formulas:
= f< R; 0:7 >; < O; 0:7 >; < R^O; 0:5 >g where R and O denote propositions \the pencil is red" and \the pencil is orange", respectively. Based on and the proof theory of the Logic of Agreement it is possible to perform the following inference steps: 
Conclusions
In this paper, a semantic approach to formalizing approximate reasoning, based on the concept of agreement, was introduced. The relation between agreement and fuzzy membership was used to emphasize some aspects of the fuzzy theory that have been criticize by other research communities. For instance, the notion of agreement was utilized to allow a formal semantic de nition for the concept of degree of membership. Moreover, some fuzzy set operators were re-evaluated in terms of the new way to de ne fuzzy membership. Based on the agreement concept, a multi-valued propositional logic | logic of agreement | was developed, in terms of its semantic system and its proof theory which is supported in a natural deduction system. This logic is a extension of the classical logic and it was proved that is sound and complete. One of the main conclusions of this work is the need for introducing either the covariance in the set operators or the equivalence connective in several inference rules of the proof theory. So, to infer under agreement more information is necessary. Albeit increasing complexity of the inference system, this is what one has to pay in order to guarantee a sound and complete logic. Finally, although the traditional foundations of FST have been questioned in this paper, the authors consider that the fundamental ideas of FST continue to be relevant, interesting and worth pursuing. The objective was to give a formal semantic explanation for the de nition of fuzzy sets, which should improve the con dence on the utilization of fuzzy set based approaches.
